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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

DL.-\~U>XD

T lPl,AH, INC., etal.,
Plaintiffs and Respond c nt .s,

-vs.CAX.AJ_j

lX~l.l{i\NCE

COi\lPAKY,
Defendant and Third Party
Plaintiff, and Respondent
and Cross Appellant.

Case No. 9284

-vs.L~NDERWRITERS

AT LLOYDS,

LONDON,
1 hird Party Defendant and
Appellant.
1

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND ,CROSS
APPEI~LANrr

C1\NAL TKS1TRANCE COMPANY

ln thi~ brief \\·e shall refer to the parties as they
are designatPd in the brief of appellant. \V. e shalllike"\\rise
rPfer to the page~ in the record and transcript by the
~a 111e form of designation.
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STAITEMENT OF FACTS
We have no quarrPl ''rith the state1nent of facts contained in appellants' brief. Ho,vever, \\·e believe that
the following a1nplification of the facts may be of assistance to the court in bringing into sharper focus the issues
of this appeal.
In their amended complaint, plaintiffs allege the issuance of a policy of physical damage insurance by Canal
to the plaintiffs, effective April 7, 19·58. (R. 28) By its
answer to the amended complaint, Canal admitted the
issuance of the policy, but denied that it ''"·as in force
and effect on June 30, 1958 (the date of the loss) (R. 31)
and alleged, as a separate defense, that the policy \\·as
cancelled on or about ~lay :2-!, 1958. (R. 32). At pretrial,
the issues were defined as ( 1) \vhether Canal's policy
\Vas in effect on the date of the los~, and ( 2) the extent of
plaintiff's damages. (R. -!1). As noted in appellants'
brief, Canal's position \\·as specifically stated in the pretrial order as follows:
"The position of the defendant i~ that the
policy· had been cancelled at a time prior to the
loss by the mailing of notices of cancellation in
accordance \\·ith the provisions of the policy." (R.
41).
Prior to the trial on plaintiff~' a1nended con1plaint
the parties stipulated on the a1nount of da1uages. It \Yas
reeognized b)· both 1)arties and the court, that the ~ingle
issue before the court at trial, \Yas \\·hether the policy
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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had been in f'aet cancelled in aeeordance \\Tith the provi:-;ions of thP poliey providing for ten days written notice
of cancellation. At the outset of the trial the following
colloquy took place bet\veen counsel :
--~Ill.

\VILl(lKSON: I think that takes care
of issue No. ~ in the Pretrial Order, leav~ng, as I
read the Pretrial Order, ouly issue No. 1 in i.ssue
at this tin~c, that being \vhether or not the insurance policy in question is in force and effect on the
date of the loss, to-wit: June 30, 1958.
"'Do you agree with that Ray~
"MR. RAY CHRISTENSEN: That is rz:.qlzt.
·~~IR. vVILKIKSON: As I understand, that
is all ·zre have this morning." ( Tr. 3.) (E1nphasis
ours.)
In his opening statentent, counsel for Canal stated as
follows:
""I would say by way of an opening statement,
your Honor, as I see this case, the simple issue
here is whether cancellation notices 1rere nutiled
to the insured, including the loss payee, in accordance 'vith the cancellation clause in the policy."
(R. 4) (Emphasis ours.)
That the court so understood, in the initial phase of
the trial, is indicated by his own co1n1nen t :
~ 'T

cannot see the 1naterialit~· of it. It isn't any
proof they did or did uot JJuzil it, and that is all you
arc interested iu." (R. -+~) (Eutphasis ours.)
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Canal, having admitted the I~suante of the policy,
was charged with the burden of proving cancellation as
an affirmative defens(-•. ( T. 3). Canal undertook to 1neet
this burden by the testintony of Steven X etolicky and
Saundra Ring\vood Redding, both of who1n \Vere employee~ of Surplus Lines at the tin1e of the clainted cancellation. Both of these witnesses testified clearly and unequivocally that notices of cancellation \\Tere 1nailed to
the named insured (plaintiff Drain), to the loss I>ayee
(plaintiff Utah Savings & Trust Company), to the insured's agent Roy James, and to the Home Office of
Canal. ( T. 32, 38, 59, 60, Ex. D-2). These were the only
cancellation notices of any Canal policy which either witness had occasion to n1ail out during the course of his
employu1ent \Yith Surplus Lines. (T. 31, 38, 61, 63). Canal
acknowledged receipt of its copy of the notice. (T. 21)
The agent James also ackno\vledged to N" etolicky that he
had received a copy of a cancellation notice, (T. ~1, ±6)
and also to Netolieky that the insured Drain had received a cancellation notice. (T. 32, 33, 36).
Prior to the tune the cancellation notices \Yere 1nailed
out, N etolicky had had son1e difficulty \vith J an1es in
collecing thP pre1nimns, both on the collision policy, and
on other for1ns of insurance \Yritten by Surplus Lines
for the Drain~. lie had 8eYeral tin1es notified J a1nes, both
orall~T and in \\·riting, that if the pren1iun1s \Yere not
pron1ptly paid, the phy~ieal da1nage polie)~ \\Tould be
<·aneelled. Just prior to the time the caneellation not ices \\·ere 1nailed, N etolick)T receiYed instructions from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Canal that it could not accept the phy~ical da1nage eov-

erage unless it also \vrote the full liability risk, and
that therefore, ~ etolieky should cancel the polic)-. ( T.
t;>, 3-±). ~Irs. Redding, in particular, \vas subjected to a
rigorou~ and ~trPnuou~ <'l'o~~ exantination by counsel for
the plaintiffs, but her testiuton)- rentained unshaken
throughout. ( T. G2-73). l)pon this testi1nony Canal rested
ih; case.
Plaintiffs offered by \Va~- of rebuttal, testi1nony of
plaintiff Drain, that he never did receive a cancellation
notice. ( T. 7~). He ad1nitted, however, on cross exanlination that his business mail was received at his home, and
that his \\Tife had access to the 1nail box. ( Tr. 86-87). He
also adrnitted that he had been \varned by J a1nes that the
policy would be cancelled if he did not produce the 1noney
to pay the pre1niums on it. (T. 88-89). Plaintiffs also
called ~lr. Bryan of the loss payee bank, who likewise
testified that he did not receive cancellation notice. ( T.
93). On cross exan1ination he testified that he opened
H1nost" of the 1nail; that it ,,-as "'usually" delivered to his
desk and that he "'usually" exrunined and sorted the 1nail.
But he admitted that so1neone else could open the mail
and that it \Yas possible for so1neone else to have opened
the mail on the date the cancellation notice "\Vas received.
(T. 96-97).
Plaintiffs also called the agent Ro)~ J a1nes, \\Tho on
direct exa1nination testified that he had received no notiee
of cancellation nor had his eliPnt, plaintiff Drain, as far
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as he kne\\·. Ho\\·ever, he admitted on cross-examination
that N etolicky had several times threatened to cancel
the policy for nonpaytnent of vretniunl. (T. 106) \\Then
confronted with his own letter he admitted that he had
received some kind of a \vritten notice of cancellation on
the Drain account. (Ex. D-3, T. 108). He also admitted
that the insured Drain had received some kind of notice.
( T. 110). He ad1nitted that he knew the cancellation \\"a~
to be effective on ~fay 2-±th, and that both received cancellation notices. ( T. 111, 112, 123, 124).
On this evidence the court initially found, that at
the date of the loss on June 30, 1958, the policy \vas in
full force and effect ~~and had not been cancelled.~, (R.
76). On 'Canal's motion for ne'v trial, it ",.as strenuously
argued to the court that the court's finding \Yas equivalent to a finding that both the "'i tnesses X etolicky and
Redding had co1nmitted perjury at trial, "\Yhereas a finding that the cancellation notices had been n1ailed 'vould
not have the effect of finding that the "itnesses Drain
and Bryan \\"ere guilty of perjury since they personally
might have not reeeived the notices even if they \\,.ere
properl~v 1nailed. See :20 . .-\_nl. J ur. 1037-1038, I~vid. § 1186.
This argu1nent \\·as apparently persuasive on the court,
because thereafter the court prepared an an1ended finding, 1-t- (a), \VhPrein the court specifieally found that
tlH~ testimon~·

of

~fr~.

Redding

,\.a8

true, and ''that she

Ina iled thP notice of eancellation to the natned in~ured and

to the loss payee, n as

tP~tified h~,.

her. (R. SG-87).
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r pon this finding on the crucial and sole issue before
the court, judgu1ent should have been entered in favor
of Canal Insurance l 10llll)any and against the plaintiffs,
no cause of aetion. lio,vever, the court, although "\villing
to correct the findings, ,,·us un\\·illing to change the result.
In order to acco1nplish this the court introduced into the
case a ne\\' theory "·hich up to that time had not been
advanced or even suggested, by the plaintiffs. It ,,·as a
theory of estoppel, based upon testi1nony received by
the court over objections of Canal throughout the trial,
that after the effective date of cancellation, further premimns "·ere paid by Drain through James and were
accepted b~· Canal's agent. The plaintiffs were permitted
to show that following the effective date of cancellation
(.Jlay :2-l:th), and on or about June 6th, the plaintiffs'
agent submitted to Canal's agent a check for $181.0-t (Ex.
P-5). This "·us to cover various obligations of Drain to
Hurplus Lines. ( T. 99-100, Ex. P -5). A1nong other things,
it "Tas to pa~· the preinituns on certain bonds "Thich ~,vere
not even 'vritten b~· Canal; (Ex. P-5, T. 100) to pay past
due installn1ents on Canal's collision policy (Ex. P-5,
T. 99-100) and to pay the do\\·n payu1ent on a liability
policy

"\\'I~tten

hy Surplus Lines in Canal for Drain, but

never delivered to Drain. ( T. 35, 49, 99, Ex. P -5). AdInittedly a substantial portion of this check was owed to
Surplus Lines ·Co1npany in any event, and it 'vas entitled
to retain a substantial portion of it. .t\ec-ording to the
testin1ony of X etolicky, it "·as all O"\\Ted to Surplus Lines.
( T. 33). The evidenc-e also

~ho,\·ed

,,·ithout di:spute that
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no demand wa~ ever made by Drain or J a1nes, or anyone
on their behalf, for any portion of the funds that Surplus
Lines \Vas not entitled to receive. (T. 91, 118).
Up to the time of trial, no claim had ever been asserted by plaintiff~ of estoppel, or reinstate1nent. As \Ve
have heretoforl~ den1onstrated, the single issue before
the court, as recognized by counsel for all parties and
the court, was as to whether cancellation notices had been
mailed. \Vhile the rules provide for liberal amendments
of the pleadings, even after trial, to conform to the proof,
the application of this rule should be limited to proof
properly received under the issues presented to the court,
or to proof received \\'"ithout objections by the party
who would be injured by it. (Rule 15 (b) ) . The proof
of pay1nent in this case \vas objected to throughout the
trial by Canal on the grounds that it had no relevancy
or materiality on the issue before the court, i.e., \vhether
cancellation noticPs \\,.ere 1nailed. That the eourt recognized that it made no proof in that regard, is a1nply den1onstrated by the court's O\\TJl finding (l!a) that the cancellation notices \vere mailed.
POIKTS TO BE "'"\RGlTED
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE POLICY
OF INSURANCE, ISSUED BY THIS DEFENDANT. 'VAS NOT
CANCELLED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE PLAIN'TIFFS.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE, OVER
THE OBJECTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT AND THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANT, AS TO PAYMENTS MADE BY
PLAINTIFFS OF PREMIUM ON THIS DEFENDAN'T'S
POLICY AFTER THE DATE OF CANCELLATION.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY WAS ESTOPPED TO PROVE CANCELLATION.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS AND THE PRETRIAL ORDER TO SET FORTH A ·THE·ORY DIFFERENT
FROM THE ONE ON WHICH THE CASE WAS TRIED AND
SUBMITTED.
POIN'T V.
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS
AND AGAINST DEFENDANT CANAL INSURANCE COMpANY, IS INCONSISTENT WITH, AND CONTRARY 'TO,
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, AND IS AGAINST THE EVIDENCE AND IS AGAINST LAW.
POINT VI.
IN THE EVENT THAT THE COURT FINDS THAT
THE JUDGlVIENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS AND
AGAINST CANAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, CANAL'S JUDGMENT OVER AGAINST LLOYDS SHOULD LIKEWISE BE
AFFIRMED.
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ARGU~IENT

POINT I.
THE COUR'T ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE POLICY
OF INSURANCE, ISSUED BY THIS DEFENDANT, WAS NOT
CANCELLED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE PLAIN·TIFFS.

The case of Jeusen v. T·raders & Gellerallusnrance
Company, 345 P.:Zd 1, a very recent decision from the Supreme Court of California is very si1nilar on its facts to
the case at bar. There \Yas presented to the California
court in that case, practically the exact points as are involved here. In that case defendant issued its automobile
policy to one DiMatteo and his father as insureds. The
policy contained a cancellation provision similar to the
one in the case at bar. On August lOth, separate notices
of cancellation \Yere mailed to Diniatteo and to his father
respectively. K either notice \Yas ever returned to defendant's office. However, both Di::\Iatteos testified that the
cancellation notices were never received by them, and
that they had no notice of any rlai1ned cancellation until
November. Regular n1onthly pre1niun1s on the poliry
were paid by Di~Iatteo through X ovember. DiJiatteo
became involved in an aeeident on X ove1nber 15th. It \vas
held b~r the Supre1ne Court of California that the cancellation provisions of the polir)r "rere clear and unequivoeal; that it \\ra~ not neee8sar~~ for the insureds actually
to receive notiee of eancPllation in order for the cancellation to be effective, and that upon proof of 1nailing of the
<·.an<'Pllation notices, as provided b)r the policy, the e.anSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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eellation \\·as

pfft~ctive

at the ti1ne specified 111 the

notice~.

'rhe eourt carefully reviewed all of the recent authorities dealing \vith thP proble1n, including a reeent annotation to \\rhich \\·e shall later refer. The opinion is itself
a rather eou1 plete brief on the sufficiency of cancellation
notices under cancellation provisions sin1ilar to those
here involved. The court further held that the 1nere fact
that premiutns "·ere paid after the effPe.tive date of cancellation, and that unearned pre1niums "·ere not returned
to the insured, "·as not suffic-ient to vitiate the cancellation. The eourt quoted from a previous trial of the same
ease, reported in 1+1 Cal. App. 2d 162, 296 P.2d ±34, as
follows:
"The duty to refund is an obligation that
springs into being when the co1npany cancels the
policy. Delay in performing, or failure to perform, thiJs duty does not of itself render cancellation ineffective.,_. (En1phasis our~.)
There is an excellent annotation on the sante question in G± A.L.R. :Zd follo\ving the report of the case of
TV est Jnoreland v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance
Corp., 144 Conn. 265, 129 A.~cl 623, 64 A.L.R. 2d 976. The
annotation co1n1nences at page 985 in_A.L.R. The authorities there cited are sufficient to "rarran t a reversal of
the judgment below, and the entry of judgn1ent in favor
of the defendant Canal Insurance Con1pany, and against
the plaintiffs, no cause of action.
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Although the court below amended its original findings by adding #1-1 (a), wherein the court specifically
found that cancellation notices \Vere Inailed, the court
never deleted or 1nodified its original Finding #1-1 to the
effect that the policy wa~ never cancelled. The said
Findings are wholly inconsistent. Finding #1-±(a) being
the latter Finding, must be presumed to 1nodify any prior
Findings inconsistent with it. l~nder the doctrine of the
authorities heretofore cited and discussed, on the basis
of Finding #l4(a), it necessarily follo\vs that the policy
was cancelled, and judgment should be entered against
the plaintiffs, no cause of action. To the same effect see
29 Am. Jur. 737-738.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE, OVER
THE OBJECTIONS OF THE DEFENDAN'T AND THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANT, AS TO PAYMENTS MADE BY
PLAINTIFFS OF PREMIUM ON THIS DEFENDANT'S
POLICY AFTER THE DATE OF CANCELLATION.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS AND THE PRETRIAL ORDER TO SET FORTH A ·THEORY DIFFERENT
FROM THE ONE ON WHICH THE CASE WAS TRIED AND
SUBMITTED.

In support of our Points II and 1\r \Ye fully endorse
I>oint II of Appellant'~ brief as set forth on pages 25 to
~8 t hPreof. In supple1nent thereof, \Ye \Yish to subn1it the
following:
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Fron1 the Parlie~t decision~ in this jurisdiction, estoppel has been considPred a~ an affir1native elaun or det'en~l\ ,,·hieh is not available unless specificall~· pleaded
and prov·ed. Poynter c. Chipnlan, 8 lTtah -1--1-:2, 3:2 P. 690 ~
/~11lldsen v. ()nuulsO'll, 10 {Ttah 1:2-1-,37 P. 250.
In HoHllH~rger & Co. 0 . .JJlex.ander & Co., 11 lTtah 363,
-1-0 P. 260, this court said :
Hif the cause of action is based upon an estoppel in pais, it is necessary that the facts con~tituting the estoppel should be pleaded. * * *
* * * Plai,nttff will not be permitted to recover
upon the gro1tnd of an estoppel which is not set
up in the pleadings. The estoppel consti.t·utes a
disti~ct cause of action, and cannot b.e taken advantage of, either as a gro·u nd of recovery or a
defense, ·un1e~i.,·s pleaded. The object of the declaratiJon is to gt"ve the defendant fair notice of tlze
ca8e he is called into court to nteet. A count
charging hin1 \\"i th the acceptance of a bill of exchange cannot be held to infor1n him that he will
be called upon to Ineet a liability on the ground
of estoppel.' " ( Eu1phasis ours.)
In ReyHolds
court said:

0.

Pasco,

~-1-

Utah

~19,

G6 P. 1064, this

"In the present case no estoppel \Yas pleaded.
Therefore that question cannot be raised in this
case. 8 Enc. Pl. & Prac. pp. 8, 9."
See also Berow ·0·. Shields, 48 l~tah :270, 159 P. 538;
Evona lnv. Co. v. Brummitt, 166 Utah 82, 240 P. 113;
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Barber v. Anderson, 73 lJtah 357, 27-! P. 136; Cantpbell v.
Nunn, 78 Utah 316, 2 P.2d 899, and Pay.son Bldg. & Loan
Soc. v. Taylor, 87 Utah 302, 48 P.2d 894.

The rule is incorporated in our present rules of
civil procedure, Rule 8( c), U. R. C. P. As \\·e have heretofore pointed out in sorne detail in our statement of
facts, not only did plaintiffs never plead estoppel, but
they never asserted it at any other phase of the proceedings. No such claims "·ere advanced at pretrial or at
trial, or even at the time of argument on defendant's
1notion for new trial. Indeed the doctrine of estoppel \Yas
not introduced by the plaintiffs at all, but by the trial
judge, and then only after argument on the motion for
new trial, and after there \Yas no opportunity on the part
of ·Canal to meet the supposed issue.
While Rule 15 (b) permits amend1nents to confonn
to the evidence, ",.here issues are tried by expre~s or inzpl~ed consent of the partiesJ that rule has no application
here. The court's finding of estoppel is apparently based
upon the evidence that pny1nents \\·ere received by Canal's
agent after the effectiYe date of cancellation. Ho\vever,
such evidenee \\·as consistently objected to by counsel for
Canal throughout the trial. It "·as never received by
Pither Pxpress or in1plied consent. This ease apears to fall
squarely ". i thin the prinei ples enuneia ted by this court
in the ease of Taylor c. E. JI. Royle Corp., (l~tah)~ :2G-±
1_). 2d 27D, and "f...,.atioua11 larJners lTJn~on Prop·erfy & Casualty (}o. v. Tlunnpsou, ( l Ttah), 28G P.2d 249, both of
1
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,,·hich are quoted in appellants, brief. .l\s said b~,. thi~
court in thP reeent case of Buelz ner Block Co. u. Gle.zos,
(Utah), :~10 P.2d 517,519:
HRule 16(b) and Rule 5-!(c) . . . provide in
es:-;Pn<'P that ( VPn though issues are not raised
h~· the pleadings, if the~· are tried by expres.s or
inlplied consent of the ZHtrties, a final judgment
can be rendered on such issues. But, as this court
has held on prior oeeas ions, t lz e ad ner se party
should be ,qicen the benefit of every doubt. He
utust not have been ntisled nor in any vvay prejudiced by the introduction of the new issues."
(Emphasis ours.)
1

It follovvs therefore that the court erred in receiving
evidence of pay1nents over objections of (_~anal and that
the eourt like,vise erred in per1nitting plaintiffs to amend
their pleadings and the pretrial order to introduce an
entirel~· ne\\· theor~·, after the ease had been tried and a
n1otion for new trial had been argued.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY WAS ES'TOPPED TO PROVE CANCELLATION.

Even if it be conceded that the evidence of payutent
\\·as properl~· received by the court, and that the claim
of estoppel "Tas before the court, the evidence wholly
fails to sustain the finding of estoppel. The elements of
estoppel are set forth in 19 Am. J ur. couunencing at page
()-!-:~.Basically they are these: (1) Condn('t "Thieh autounts
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to a false representation or conceahnent of rnaterial facts,
or which is calculated to convey the irnpression that the
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with those
which the party subsequently atteu1pts to assert; ( 2) intention or at least expectation that such conduct shall be
acted upon by the other party, and ( 3) kno\\·ledge, actual
or constructive, of the real facts. It is further held that
estoppels must be certain to every intent, and are not
to be taken or sustained by mere argu1nent or doubtful
inferences.
The acts, clairns or conduct relied on to estop must
be plainly inconsistent with the right afterward set up.
19 A.m. J ur., Estoppel, Sec. 43. One cannot be estopped
by reason of accepting that which he is legally entitled
to receive, 19 A.m. J ur., Estoppel, Sec. 65. The proof must
be clear, precise and unequivocal. Mere conjecture 1s
insufficient. 19 A.m. J ur. 852, Estoppel, Sec. 199.
The foregoing principles \Yere recognized by this
court in the case of Peterson v. Ogden CiJty, (l~tah), 116
P.~d 599, \Yhere it \\·as held that Ogden City "·as not
estopped from attacking a tax deed because the city
received frorn the county its proportion of the money
obtained fro1n the plaintiff at the tax sale.
We have been unable to find any similar case where
it has ever been contended that a policy of insurance once
cancelled, can be revivPd by the silnple expedient of
H(~nding in a pre1niuin payn1ent. Son1e,vhat analogous
is tht~ l\1arYland
case of Busb11 l;. The ~'orth . A.n1erican
.
~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
l_)t}e 1 Jl.-.,·. ()o._. -±0 ~ld. ;)7:2, 17 Aut. l~ep. G3-!. In that case
it \ra~ held that thP insurer's agent could not by receiving
an ovPrdue preutiuut, revive the policy after it had lapsed.
lt \ra~ further held that the receipt and retention of
1none~· h~· the co1upa11.Y \\·as not a ratification of the
agPnCs aet~ \\·ithout proof that the ro111pany acted \\·ith
kno\vledge of the fact~. The court quoted with approval
from Bouton v. The Anterican Mutual Life Ius. Co. as
follows:

"\V·e think that he (the agent), \Vas not elnpowered to receive any pre1niuu1 \vhich \vas not
paid according to the require1nents of the policy,
that is in advance. That instrun1ent \vas his sole
guide in regard to \\·hat he should do under it.
The contract \vas to be 1nade by the defendants,
and not by hi1n, excepting in the capacity of their
agent; he was not authorized to alter or vary it,
or depart in any respect fron1 it, or dispense \vith
the fulfillment of its conditions by the insured,
or discharge it, or revive it after it had h~T its
terms ceased to be obligatory on his principal, hy
a waiver of co1npliance \\·ith its provisions or
otherwise. These must be done hy thP partiE·s to
the contract. He was only authorized to act in
pursuance of it, and then so far only as it gave
him authority. He could exercise only the power
delegated to hi1n to depart from the tern1s of the
policy.' ''
H

See also the recent case of Janze~ u. United States
of Anzerioa, 185 F.2d 113, \vhere the court said:
"For another reason, insured's polic~· was not
reinstated by estoppel. \Vaiver or esfO]JJJel 1rill
not operate to reinstate a policy u Hless the illSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sured has performed the necessary conditions precedent and has perfected his application." (Elnphasis ours.)

There is no sho\\'ing here that plaintiff ever applied
for reinstatement.
The basic elements of an estoppel have not been made
out. The acceptance by Canal's agent of the check for
the premium cannot be said to be an unequivocal representation or connnitment that the policy \Yas still in effect. On the contrary, the evidence is "rithout dispute
that there was a balance owed by the insureds not only
on the policy here involved, but also on other policies,
including the policies \Yritten by Canal, and policies written by other companies for \Yhich Surplus Lines \Yas also
an agent. The Surplu~ Lines manager testified that the
entire amount of the check \Yas insufficient to bring the
account current. Therefore, in accepting the check, Surplus Lines accepted it under a claim of right for past due
obligation~. The acceptance of this check and the retention of the proceeds thereof for a period of less than a
month before the aceident, is certainly not clear and unequivocal proof of a representation by Canal's agent that
the policy \vas still in effect.
Neither is tht)re any sho\ving of intention or expectation that Canal'~ aeeeptanee of the check \Vould be relied
upon hy the other party, as indicating \Yillingness to c.ontinue to carrY. thP ri~lc On the contrarv~
. X etolickY. testified that hP explained to plaintiffs~ agent that Canal,
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undPr it:-; 0\\'11 under"Triting rules, could not continuP to
('HIT~· the risk an~·,,·ay, ~intP plaintiffs \\·erP un,villing
to 'vrite all their lial)ilit~· insuranee "Tith Canal.
XPither is there an~· proof that (;anal had kno\vledge
of facts dift'<~rent f'ron1 those 'vhieh their agent expressly
or by intplication represented. \rie,ving the evidence in
the light 1uost favorable to the plaintiffs, it cannot he
said that an~r of the eleinents of estoppel have been n1ade
out.
POIN'T V.
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS
AND AGAINST DEFENDANT CANAL INSURANCE COMpANY, IS INCONSISTENT WITH, AND CONTRARY 'TO,
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, AND IS AGAINST THE EVIDENCE AND IS AGAINST LAW.

In support of our Point V 've fully endorse the argulnent advanced hy appellant under its Point I, as set forth
at pages 18 to 2-1 of its brief. \\r e also refer to the arguluent '"hich ''"·e have advanced under Point I and Point II .
. A. ny further argun1ent at this point 'vould be purely
repetitious.
POINT VI.
IN THE EVENT THAT THE COURT FINDS THAT
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS AND
AGAINST CANAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, CANAL'S JUDGMENT OVER AGAINST LLOYDS SHOULD LIKEWISE BE
AFFIRMED.
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In the event that the court finds in our favor on the
preceding points, Point \TI will become moot and it will
be unnecessary to consider it. lfo"rever, in the event that
the court finds adversely to the position of Canal with
. respect to the claims of plaintiffs, it will be necessary
for the court to consider this point, wherein ·w·e answer
appellants' Point III.
The case bet\\·een Canal and Lloyds \\Ta~ submitted
to the court on a written stipulation of facts \vhich is
set forth in Appellants' brief, commencing on Page 11.
It may be noted that on and prior to April 8, 1958, the
Benson Company \vas the representative of both Canal
and Lloyds, \vith authority to \\Trite policies of insurance
on behalf of both of them. Both the Canal policy and
Lloyds Certificate of reinsurance \vere written by the
Benson Company as representative of each. Benson
Company continued as representative of Lloyds up to
the time of the claimed cancellation on both policies of
insurance. Ho\vever, after April Sth, H. F. Benson, Jr.,
was ·Canal' agent. He had an oral understanding \vith
l~anal that he \vould keep reinsured in Lloyds all physical
damage insurance \rritten in Canal to the extent of not
less than 7570 of the entire risk. See stipulated Facts
~ o. 3 to No. 5 inclusive.
At about the ~~une ti1ue that the notices of cancellation on the Canal polic~T \Yere 1nailed out, a paper denorninated a General Change Endonse1nent to the Lloyds
1
(~ertifien:tP of R.ein~urance \YH~ 1nailed to ( anal. The
0Pneral l~hange Endorse1nent rl)eited as follo\\TS: ''In
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eon~ i dP ration

of a ret urn pre nil u1n of $-±18.08 and $4.18
reinsurance tax, this certificate tenninated in conjullcfioll
willi ovPrla ~· ing Canal poli ey." (Emphasis ours.)

1t \\·ill be notLld that thP General Uhange 1£ndorseInent \Va~ signed on behalf of Lloyds by H. F. Benson,
Jr., Canal'~ O\\'n agent. The single i~~ue presented to the
court on the third party co1nplaint against Lloycls i~
\vhether the G-eneral L~hange Endor~en1ent \vas sufficient to acco1nplish a cancellation or termination of
Lloyds reinsurance eertificate to Canal, if the Canal
policy had not been effectively cancelled.
It is interesting to note that although the Lloyds'
certificate provided for cancellation by ten days' written
notice of cancellation, the usual forn1 of cancellation
notice \vas not sent out. Instead, the agent used a ""general change endorsentent" which in and of itself tends to
create so1ne a1nbiguity a~ to the intent. It is the contention of Canal that the general change endorsement did
not, and could not, effect a cancellation of the reinsurance
certificate, unless the (~anal policy was also cancelled. By
the express language of the endorse1nent, the certificate
is tenninated ··in conj nnctio n \vith overlaying (ianal
policy." The phrase ·~in conjunction with," Ineans "in
association \Yith,'' or ""occurring together," or ·"concurrence or contbination of events.'' See Black'~ La\v Dictionary, 3rd Ed. page 230; Blaisdell v. InllaiJitants of Town
of York, 110 ~[e. 500, 87 A. 361 and \Y ebster's X e\v International Dictionary, page 474.
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By the express language of the general change endorsement it was to take effect "in conjunction \vith,"
or "in association with" the ·Canal policy. lt follows therefore, that if the Canal policy \\Tas not cancelled, the
Lloyd's certificate \vas not rancelled. That the intent
was to cancel the reinsurance only in conjunction
with i.e. simultaneously with, the ·Canal policy is 1nore
1nanifest, when it is viewed in light of the agent's
understanding \Yith Canal that it would reinsure, and
keep reinsured, all physical damage risks, to the extent
of not less than 75r0 of the amount of insurance. It must
also be borne in mind that Canal's Agent, H. F. Benson,
Jr., signed the General Change Endorsement on behalf of
Lloyds. In vie\v of his oral understanding \vith Canal,
and in the absence of any showing of motive or reason
for doing so, it is inconceivable that he would have \vanted
to, or attempted to cancel the reinsurance certificate,
except ''in conjunction \vith the overlaying ·Canal policy."
It is further to be noted, that the ter1nination is, by
its language, in consideration of a return pre1niun1 of
$418.08 and $4.18 reinsurance tax. There is no evidence
that the return pre1niun1 \vas ever offered or tendered to
Canal, or received or accepted by it. 'Vhile it is true
that, under the language of the Lloyds certificate, the
tender of the unearned prenuum \\Tas not necessary to
effect cancellation, if unequivocal cancellation notiee8
were 1nailed, such \va_s not the case here. Here the representative of Llo~Tds 1nadP the return of unearned prenlimn
thr eon~ideration for trr1nination of the reinsurance
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('Prtil'ie(ttP, and sin(•p there \\'a~ a failure of consideration, thP elain1ed ter1nination b~· the general change endor~Plnent is like,,·i~e invalid on that ground.
1 1 :vl~n

if it ean Le f'airl~· argued that the language of
the g(·neral ehange endor~e1nent was ~usceptible to 1nore
than one interpretation, such does not aid Lloyds. lt is
\vell settled that cancellation is an affir1native defense,
and the party asserting it has the burden of proof. Trans.Antericn Ins. Co. u. Wilson, 263 Ala. G::t~, 80 So. 2d 253.
It i~ equally \rell settled that a cancellation notice, to be
effective, must be clear, unconditional and unequivocal,
and that any a1nbiguities in it will be resolved in favor
of the insured, and against the insurer. In 6 Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance La,v, Sec. 1-±-±2, page 5098, it is said:
"'Provisions for cancellation in an insurance
polic~· 1nust bP strictly follo\ved to effect that result. .. The principle that underlies the decisions
is that a party is precluded fron1 destroying the
existing contract rights except upon a strict observance of the reservations contained in the contract itself, or so1ne statute, or by agreement with,
or \\Taiver of his rights hy, the other party. But
in the absence of \\'aiver or estoppel it is generally
agreed that a uotice of caucel!atiou to the insnred
uutst be clear, uHconditional and unequivocal, and
that a 1nere expression of a purpose or intention
to cancel in the future is not sufficient; that is,
it must be one of actual eaneellation, not of future
conditional cancellation, or of doubtful ;neanio.rJ
as to tin~e or purpose ... ( E1nphasis ours.)
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The same author says at page 5100:
"Furthermore, notice to cancel, must be an
actual one within the terms and meaning of the
policy, it not being sufficient to state merely an
intent to cancel upon compliance or noncompliance, as the case rnay be, 'vith sorne condition;
it must so unequivocally inform insured as to
leave no doubt on his part that his poliey "~in expire at the end of the period limited within the
terms of the policy, and that insurer's liability
under the contract will then cease." (En1phasis
ours).
See also ·§ 1406, p. 5021.
In 29 Am. J ur., 733, Insurance, Sec. 383, it is said:
"Generally speaking, a strict con1pliance 'Yith
a policy provision for notice is essential to effect a
cancellation by such a notice and a nzb·igu ities iu
the noti'ce will be resolre.d in favor of the ivnsured." (Emphasis ours.)
See also § 379, pp. 730-731.
In \ .. olume 6, .L\ppleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sec. 4185, page 722, it is said:
''Such notice rnust be Pxpressed in positrre,
clear and unequivocal tern1.s. A notice must be
in accordanee "·ith the poliey provi~ions. and n1ust
be explieit~ pcrcnzpfory. and unconditional, so that
the in~urPd "·ill not be left in doubt a~ to the expiration date of thP polie~~.'~ (J~n1phasis ours.)
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~\nd

in Lindy c. Lititz "Afutual
100 SE2d 3-l-t, the court said:

In~.

l 1o., 232 S.C. 1,

'· \ Vhile notiee of cancellation need not be in
an~· particular for1n, it 111ust be of ~ueh character
a~ to positi,z;cl.IJ an.d uueqn£vocally incU~cale to the
in.",.ttred that the CoJJlJHlll.lJ doe~ not intend longer
to be bound by the contract . ... Any ambiguity in
the uoticc 'ln1tst be resolved in favor of the ..:1ss~tred.'' (Emphasis ours.)
~ee

also Cluunvers v. Washington J.Vat. Ins. Co., (Ga.
App.), 17 SE2d 899, and Medford v. Pacific National Fire
Tns. Co., (Ore.), 219 P. (2d) 142.
Although we have attempted to make a diligent research of the subject, \Ve have been tmable to locate any
case closely similar in fact to the case at bar. IIowever,
upon the general principles above set forth, a determination in favor of ·Canal, on this point, is required. By the
express language of the general change endorse1nent the
ter1nination \\ras to beco1ne effective only ''in conjunction
\vith," or association \\ri.th the termination of the Canal
policy. If the Canal policy \Yas not cancelled, it follows
that the Lloyds reinsurance certificate \\ras not cancelled.
Even if there are so1ne ambiguities in the 1natter, they
1nust be resolved in favor of the insured, which in this
instance, is Canal, and against the insurer (Lloyds).
CONCLUSION
The trial court unequivocally found that cancellation
notices on the Canal policy \Yere mailed to the plaintiff~
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1n accordance with the cancellation proVIsions of the
policy. It necessarily follo,vs therefor, that the policy
was cancelled prior to the date of loss and Canal has no
liabililty to the plaintiffs, or any of them, for the damage
to their truck. Estoppel was not plead or otherwise asserted by plaintiffs and any evidence received in support
thereof 'vas improperly received; and the evidence before
the court was 'vholly insufficient to raise an estoppel
against Canal to assert the cancellation of the policy.
Canal is entitled to have judgment rendered in its favor
and against plaintiffs, no cause of action, or at the very
least, a new trial, to meet the issue of estoppel raised in
the court below for the first time after argument on Inotion for new trial. If it is determined that Canal's policy
was not effectively cancelled, it necessarily follo,vs that
the Lloyds certificate of reinsurance was not cancelled
and Canal's judgment against Lloyds should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
.JIORETOK~

CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN
By: RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for defendant and
respondent and cross appellant
Canal Insurance Company
1205 ·Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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